Background and causes of the Iranian Revolution

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The Iranian Revolution is a populist, nationalist, and Shiite revolution that replaces the secular dictatorship monarchy with theocracy based on the "Guardians of the Islamic Jurists" (or efaqi.).

The reason - why the last Shah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) was overthrown and why he was replaced by the Islamic Republic - is the subject of a historical debate. The revolution was partly a conservative reaction to Western-backed westernization, modernization and secularization of the Shah, and a more popular reaction to social injustice and other deficiencies of the ancien régime. Shah is regarded by many Iranians as being - if not puppets - Western powers (especially the United States) whose culture is polluting Iran. The Shah regime was seen as oppressive, brutal, corrupt, and extravagant; it also suffers from basic functional failures, such as an overly ambitious economic program that brings economic congestion, shortages, and inflation.

Video Background and causes of the Iranian Revolution

Latar Belakang 1906-1977

Reverend Shi'a (or Ulema, ) has a significant influence in Iran. The clerics first showed themselves as a powerful political force against the Iranian king by a boycott of the 1891 Tobacco Protection which effectively destroyed the unpopular concessions granted by shah gave British companies a monopoly on the purchase and sale of tobacco in Iran. For some events it shows that Shia scholars are "Iran's first line of defense" against colonialism.

Reza Shah

The dynasty which was overthrown by the revolution - the Pahlavi dynasty - is known for its autocracy, its focus on modernization and westernization and for ignoring the religious and democratic measures in the Iranian constitution.

The founder of the dynasty, army general Reza Pahlavi, replaced the Islamic law with western law, and banned traditional Islamic clothing, separation of sexes and women's veils (hijab). Women who refuse the ban on their public veil, their rates are forcibly removed and torn apart. In 1935 a rebellion by a devout Shiite at the Imam Reza temple in Mashhad was destroyed by his command with dozens of people killed and hundreds of injuries, destroying the ties between Shah and Shiites in Iran.

The last Shah Iran is in power

Reza Shah was ousted in 1941 by an invasion of British and Soviet allied forces who believed he sympathized with the enemies of Nazi Germany's allies. His son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was installed by allies as king. Prince Pahlavi (later crowned as shah) ruled until the 1979 revolution with one brief interruption. In 1953 he left the country after a power struggle with Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Mossadegh is remembered in Iran for being elected into power through democratic elections, nationalizing Iran's oil fields belonging to Iran, and ousted in a military coup organized by American CIA agents and assisted by the British MI6. So foreign powers are involved both in the installation and recovery of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Shah maintains a close relationship with the United States, both regimes are equally afraid of/against the expansion of the Soviet/Russian state, Iran's strong northern neighbor. Leftists and Islamists attacked his government (often from outside Iran because they were bullied inside) for violating Iran's constitution, political corruption, and political oppression by SAVAK (secret police).

The rise of Ayatollah Khomeini

The Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution, first became a political figure in 1963 when he led the opposition to the Shah and his reform program known as the "White Revolution", which aims to break the possession of land owned by some Shiites. 'a scholar, enabling women to elect and religious minorities to hold office, and provide women's legal equality in marital matters.

Khomeini states that the Shah had "initiated the destruction of Islam in Iran" and openly denounced the Shah as "a pathetic sad man." After Khomeini's arrest on 5 June 1963, three days of massive unrest erupted across Iran, with Khomeini supporters claiming 15,000 killed by Khomeini police gunfire detained and held under house arrest for 8 months. After his release, he continued his aggression against the Shah, condemning the regime's close cooperation with Israel and its "capitulation" - an extension of diplomatic immunity to US government personnel in Iran. In November 1964, Khomeini was recaptured and sent into exile where he stayed for 14 years until the revolution.

A period of "unsatisfied calm" followed. Regardless of political repression, the resurgence of Islam began to undermine the idea of ​​westernization as the progress that became the basis of Shah's secular regime and shaped the ideology of the revolution. Jalal Al-e-Ahmad's idea of ​​ Gharbzadegi - that Western culture is an epidemic or intoxication that must be eliminated; Ali Shariati's vision of Islam as the true liberator of the Third World of oppressive colonialism, neo-colonialism, and capitalism; and the forgery popularized by Morteza Motahhari of Shi'ite religion, all spread and gained listeners, readers and supporters. Most importantly, Khomeini proclaimed that rebellion, and especially martyrdom, against injustice and tyranny is part of Shia Islam, and that Muslims should reject the influence of capitalism and communism with the slogan "Both the East and the Islamic Republic of the West!" " (Persian: ????? ?????? ?????? ? )

To replace the Shah's regime, Khomeini developed the ideology of velayat-e faqih as a government, that Muslims - in fact everyone - needed "guardianship", in the form of rule or supervision by leading Islamic jurists or jurists. Such a rule would protect Islam from deviations from traditional sharia law, thereby eradicating poverty, injustice, and "looting" Muslim lands by unbelieving foreigners. Forming and obeying this Islamic government is "an expression of obedience to God" , ultimately "more important than even prayer and fasting" in Islam, and a command for all the world, not limited on Iran.

Publicly, Khomeini focuses on the socio-economic problems of the Syah regime (corruption, income and unequal development), not the solution of his rule by Islamic jurists.

He believes the propaganda campaign by the Western imperialists has harmed much of Iran against theocratic government.

But his book is widely distributed among religious circles, especially among Khomeini students, former students, and traditional business leaders. A strong and efficient opposition network began to develop inside Iran, using sermons in the mosques, tapes smuggled by Khomeini, and other means. Added to this religious opposition are the students and secular and Islamic modernist guerrilla groups who admire the history of Khomeini's resistance, though they must clash with theocracy and be suppressed by his movement after the revolution.

Opposition groups and organizations

The constitutionalist, Marxist, and Islamic groups opposed the Shah:

The first signs of disagreement in 1977 came from Iran's constitutional liberals. Based in the urban middle class, this is part of a fairly secular population and wants the Shah to comply with the Iranian Constitution of 1906 rather than the religious rule. Prominent in it are Mehdi Bazargan and liberal groups, moderate Islamist groups, the Iranian Freedom Movement, and the more secular National Front.

The scholars are divided, allied with various liberal, Marxist, and Islamist circles. Various anti-Shah groups operate from outside Iran, mostly in London, Paris, Iraq, and Turkey. Speeches by leaders of these groups were placed on audio cassettes to be smuggled to Iran. Khomeini, who is in exile in Iraq, works to unite the opposition of ulama and secular, liberal and radical under his leadership by avoiding specifics - at least in public - that may divide factions.

The Marxist group is illegal and strongly suppressed by SAVAK's internal security apparatus. They include the communist Tudeh Party in Iran; two armed organizations, the Iranian People's Organization, Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG) and the separating Iran's People's Fedai Guerrillas (IPFG); and some small groups. The guerrilla goal was to defeat the Pahlevi regime with murders and guerrilla warfare. Although they played an important role in the overthrow of the 1979 regime, they were significantly weakened by government oppression and divisions in the first half of the 1970s.

Islamists are divided into several groups. The Iranian Freedom Movement, comprised of members of the Iranian National Front who wanted to use the legitimate political method of Shah and led by Bazargan and Mahmoud Taleghani. The Resistance of Iranians, a semi-Marxist armed organization that oppose the influence of scholars and then combat the Khomeini Islamic government.

The ultimately victorious Islamist group that contains the core supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. Among them were several small armed Islamist groups who joined together after the revolution in the Mujahideen of the Islamic Revolution Organization. The Islamic Society Coalition was founded by a religious bazaar (traditional traders). The Combined Clerical Association consists of Morteza Motahhari, Mohammad Beheshti, Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Mofatteh, who later became the main leader of the Islamic Republic. They used a cultural approach to fight the Shah.

Because of internal repression, opposition groups abroad, such as the Confederation of Iranian students, the outer branches of the Iranian Freedom Movement and the Islamic Student Association, are vital to the revolution.

1970-1977

Some events in the 1970s set the stage for the 1979 revolution:

In October 1971, the 2500 anniversary of the establishment of the Persian Empire was held at the site of Persepolis. Only foreign officials are invited to a three-day party whose luxury includes more than a ton of caviar, and preparation by about two hundred chefs flown in from Paris. The fee is officially $ 40 million but is estimated to be in the range of $ 100-120 million. Meanwhile, drought struck Baluchistan province, Sistan, and even Fars where the celebration was held. "When foreigners enjoy drink banned by Islam, Iranians are not just out of celebration, some are starving."

By the end of 1974, the oil boom began to produce not the "Great Civilization" promised by the Shah, but "worried" the rise in inflation and wastage and the "acceleration gap" between rich and poor, cities and countries. The nationalist Iranians are angered by tens of thousands of skilled foreign workers who come to Iran, many of whom are helping to operate the unpopular and expensive American high-tech gadgets that the Shah has spent hundreds of millions of dollars.

The following year the party Rastakhiz has been created. Not just the only party allowed by Iranians, but an "entire adult population" should belong and pay the dues. The party seeks to take on populist merchants and imprison merchants in "anti-profiteering" campaigns, but this proves not only economically dangerous but also politically counterproductive. Inflation turned into a black market and business activity declined. Merchants get angry and politicized.

In 1976, the Shah's government angered the pious Iranians by changing the first year of Iran's sun calendar from Islam to Islam by the rise of the throne by Cyrus the Great. "Iran jumped overnight from Muslim year 1355 to 2535 royalist year." In the same year Shah declared economic austerity measures to curb inflation and wastage. Unemployment generated disproportionately affects thousands of poor and unskilled migrants to cities recently. As a conservative culture and religion, many of these people, who have tended to view secularism and Westernization of the Shah as "foreign and evil," continue to form the core of the demonstrators of the revolution and the "martyrs".

In 1977 a new American president, Jimmy Carter, was inaugurated. Carter sought to make post-Vietnam foreign policy and power training more generous, and created a special Human Rights Office. This sent Shah a "polite reminder" of the importance of political rights and freedoms. Shah responded by granting an amnesty to 357 political prisoners in February, and allowing the Red Cross to visit the prison, starting what is said to be a 'liberalization trend by the Shah'. Through late spring, summer and fall, liberal opposition organizations formed and issued open letters condemning the regime. Later that year a disagreement group (Writers' Association) gathered without division and the capture of the indigenous police, initiating a new era of political action by Shah's opponents.

That year also saw the death of the highly popular and influential modernist Islamist leader Ali Shariati, who allegedly was in the hands of SAVAK, pushed aside a potential revolutionary rival to Khomeini. Finally, in October Khomeini's son, Mostafa died. Although the cause appears to be a heart attack, the anti-Shah group blames SAVAK poisoning and proclaims it as a 'martyr.' The next commemorative worship for Mostafa in Tehran put Khomeini back in the spotlight and began the process of building Khomeini into the Shah's main opponent.

Maps Background and causes of the Iranian Revolution

Common causes

The Iranian Revolution has a number of unique and significant characteristics. This results in massive changes very quickly; and replace the ancient monarchy with theocracy based on the Guardians of the Islamic Jurisprudence (or velayat-e faqih ). The result - an Islamic Republic "under the guidance of a religious scholar in the 80-year-old exile of Qom" - is, as a scholar said, "explains an event to be explained...."

Surprises and absence of custom reason

The revolution is unique because of the surprises it creates around the world, and follows the proverb that appears "impossible" until it seems "inevitable".

Some of the common causes of less revolution include

• lose war,
• peasant uprising,
• giant national debt,
• disgruntled military;

The ousted regime is considered highly protected by army and luxury-financed security services. As one observer observed: "Few expect the Shah regime, which receives international support and 400,000 modern armies, collapsed before unarmed demonstrators in a matter of months."

Other historians note that the revolution is "unique in the history of modern world history in that it brings power not a new social group equipped with political parties and secular ideologies, but a traditional cleric armed with a pulpit and claiming a divine right to oversee all temporary authorities, even the highest representatives selected by the state. "

Cause

Britain, the United States and the old Soviet Union competed with each other for Iranian dominance. Britain maintained the control of the Iranian oil industry for a long time using its alliance with the power of the blocks, landlords and courts and was able to reduce US and Soviet forces in Iran. On the other hand, the United States and the Soviet Union are primarily interested in logistically important locations in Iran and want oil concessions in northern Iran. The United States used its influence in the military and the interim Tribunal of the Soviet Union received the full support of the Tudeh Party and the CCFTU. Shah himself is very interested to involve the United States in Iran's affairs to rearrange troops and improve the economy with the help of the United States. The United States, too, can reduce the influence of communism in Iran by its more open presence in Iran. In the late 1950s, the US was fed up with widespread corruption in the Iranian government and began reducing its financial aid to Iran. In 1958, the United States also sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to replace the Shah with Iran's chief of staff, a reform-oriented politician, to encourage social reform in Iran. When Shah realized that his government and Iran's economic health depended on the US, he decided to liberalize his policy. Therefore, the Shah, with some pressure from the Kennedy government, chose the Amini group, which has no popular base, but full US support and a clear reform program.

Amini's agenda was to broadcast land reform, reduce corruption, stabilize the economy, limit the Shah's power and reduce the size and influence of the Army. Despite having a reformist ideology, Amini did not get popular support from the National Front, identified with Mossadegh, and the Tudeh Party. The Amini government was very unbelievable by the people because of its extraordinary support from the Consortium agreement and was widely criticized by the Tudeh Party as spreading anti-communism and becoming an American puppet. The Amini government collapsed after fifteen months of struggling with an economic dilemma, people's distrust and the Shah tried to convince Kennedy to divert his support from Amini to him. In 1962, Amini resigned and Alam, a loyal friend of shah who had no intention of reforming but to consolidate monarchical power, became the new prime minister and laid the foundation for the Shah to rebuild his dictatorship in early 1963.

In the mid-1970s, the Shah was once again taken under US pressure for violating human rights and the persecution of political prisoners. The crippling crises of the country made Shah worried about his future throne. Although, it was highly undesirable for the Shah to introduce another round of liberalization policies, the first round was in the early 1960s, he had no choice but to do so. Therefore, in early 1977 Shah announced a liberalization policy to gain US support once again and resolve the country crisis. In mid 1977, Shah allowed open discussion forums for the Rastakhiz Party to discuss social issues openly. As Amjad quotes Tocqueville in his book, political liberalization after a long period of repression has resulted in social upheaval and revolution. In the case of Iran, although the aim of the policy was to pacify the opposition and win US support, it provided conditions suitable for the opposition to regulate its forces against the regime. Following liberalization policies, a network of 80,000 mosques run by 180,000 mullahs played a crucial role in mobilizing the people against the regime.

Doubts about causes

Charles Kurzman, author of The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran has postulated that the explanation offered by observers for why the revolution takes place "is only partially valid," and that "the closer we hear the people making the revolution - the more anomalies that we find. "

Kurzman points out that one explanation for the overthrow of the Shah - the 40-day cycle (Arba'een) to commemorate the deaths of protestors - "stalled" on June 17, 1978, half a year before the peak of the revolution. The moderate religious leader (Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari) called for calm and strike at home which prevented more victims to commemorate 40 days later. Kurzman also argues that the mourning ritual in Iran has been a political act only once before.

Can we say in early 1977 that because Iranian culture included a forty-day mourning cycle, the country is more likely than any other country to undergo a revolution? I do not think so. On the contrary, a knowledgeable observer might note that this mourning cycle has been used to protest only once in the history of Iran, in 1963, and the movement was in vain.

Alexis de Tocqueville's idea that "prosperity is increasing, far from calming the population, everywhere promoting the spirit of unrest", has been offered by some observers as an explanation for the 1978-1979 uprising. But this does not explain why "there is little opposition activity" in the 1975-1976 recession when unemployment and inflation are at the same level as 1978. Furthermore, the revolution is conspicuously absent in other "high growth autocracies" - Venezuela, Algeria, Nigeria , Iraq - in the 1970s and 1980s despite the fact that the countries also suffered from oil wealth issues (corruption, debt, deception, oppression).

Another cause, or partial cause, in doubt is the liberalization of the Shah as a result of the encouragement of President Jimmy Carter. Kurzman points out that "even when shah arrived in Washington" for a state visit at the end of 1977, "his partial regime's tolerance of opposition activity disappeared... In November 1977, when Shah took his heart with Jimmy Carter, the liberals in retreat."

Another writer, Moojan Momen, questioned whether Carter "could have said or done" anything to save the Shah - apart from ignoring the human rights policy - because "America's direct intervention will only increase hatred" against the pro-American Shah.

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Custom theory

Skocpol cultural theory

Theda Skocpol, an American socialist specializing in the study of social revolution, proposed an unprecedented cultural theory to explain the unique aspect of the Iranian Revolution which he admits has falsified his past historical theories about the causes of social revolution.

Skocpol argues that the revolution deviates from the revolution of the past in three different ways:

1. The revolution appears to have been solely due to the rapid modernization by the state that caused social disturbance. Skocpol's study of past modern social revolutions has faked this popular but simple theory.
2. In the departure of historical precedents, the regime's large, modern army and police were defeated by an internal revolution without a military defeat in a foreign war and without external pressure aimed at causing divisions between the dominant state and society. class.
3. The Iranian revolution is the only modern revolution deliberately and coherently mobilized by a revolutionary movement composed of different social classes united under the leadership of a senior Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This was achieved through demonstrations and strikes that advanced with vigor against even deadly military repression. Thus the revolution achieved "what Western socialists have long ago only done."

Although the Shah's regime has some political vulnerabilities, none of them can be important because the Shah is still rich and strong enough to overcome the wave of social discontent, as well as other less wealthy poor people who have been able to become the rulers of the third world. The fact that the revolution is successful can only be explained by referring to the sustained and sustained efforts by Iranian urban people to weaken and weaken the regime.

Despite the negative impact of the Shah's busy modernization on traditional urban life forms, it causes more people, consisting of rural and abandoned farmers, to connect with members of traditional urban communities such as bazaaris and craftsmen. The bazaar is specifically the center of association life, with Islamic groups and the opportunity of binding common people through scholars' interpreting Islamic law to resolve commercial disputes and burdening the rich to provide for the welfare of obedient poor followers. Succession of endless prayer and ritual meetings is organized by priests and laymen. The Bazaar also enjoys connections with the more modern Iranian public sector as many Iranian university students come from the merchant class. But since the 1970s, the Shah raised defenses and opposition from bazaars by controlling their autonomous councils and marginalizing the clergy by taking over their educational and welfare activities.

In the mass revolutionary movement during 1977-8, traditional urban societies played a very important role in making sustainable mass struggles possible. Workers rely on economic aid from the bazaar during their strike and secular opponents depend on alliances with clerics and lay leaders of the bazaar to mobilize the masses. Without this source of support and autonomous support, successful resistance to the holders of modern political and economic power is impossible.

Source of the article : Wikipedia